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GATT: A COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
IN A NONCOOPERATIVE TRADING REGIME?
1. Introduction
Many observers of the international economy claim that the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is not working-that many of the major international players
are not abiding by the rules and are instead impeding trade through the use of nontariff
restrictions (Stern 1987). Besides nontariff measures, many point to defects in the dispute
settlement mechanism as a contributing factor to this breakdown (Jackson 1979). This
paper will examine this 'breakdown' of GATT by specifically modeling the dispute settle-
ment procedure with nontariff barriers (NTBs). It is found that the equilibrium outcome(s)
involves each country imposing nontariff barriers to trade.
One well known reason to impose trade barriers is to increase welfare. and one connnon
policy is the import tariff. The theoretical possibility of improving the terms of trade has
long been recognized: if a country is a large enough buyer in world markets, it can improve
its terms of trade in a monopolistic manner by imposing tariffs on imports (i.e., the optimal
tariff) and thus improve welfare (Meade 1952). This gives each large country an incentive
to set the optimal tariff. However improving the terms of trade in one country necessarily
means a worsening of the terms of trade and declining welfare for the country's trading
partners.
Since a country's trade policies have effects on other countries, we have an environment
which gives rise to the possibility of strategic interaction. If one country's trade policy
harms another country then the harmed country has an incentive to retaliate. Several
investigators (Dixit 1987, Johnson 1954-55 and McMillan 1986) have formally analyzed this
idea in static 2 x 2 trade models with the result that both countries levy tariffs. On the
other hand, other researchers (Dixit 1987 and Jensen and Thursby 1980) have shown that




However, none of these studies explains why countries are resorting to NTBs. Deardorff
(1987) reviews various reasons why NTBs are preferred to tariffs. The most compelling
reason, he concludes, is the perception on the part of policy makers and their constituents
that tariffs will not reduce imports. As will be seen, simply substituting NTBs in place of
tariffs into a dynamic game does not change the outcome: cooperative behavior is still an
equilibrium strategy. NTBs must somehow be different from tariffs in terms of how trade
is restricted.
One important difference is that NTBs are not as transparent as tariffs. Some claim
that NTBs are essentially invisible and can take virtually an unlimited number of forms
(Economic Report of the President 1988). Since they are difficult to detect their use will not
invite retaliation. Some NTBs, such as the nonenforcement of certain intellectual property
right laws, were initially invisible and were discovered only after an investigation. Some
domestic measures, for example health and safety rules, while visible have an ambiguous
status. An investigation may be required to determine if a particular rule is a NTB or a
legitimate health rule.1 In either case, once a nontariff barrier is identified it is difficult to
measure its effect on trade (Deardorff and Stern 1984).
Some recent studies have incorporated NTBs into game theoretic trade models. Riez-
man (1987), in an infinitely repeated game with uncertainty and asymmetric information
(NTBs), shows that "free trade will never occur." But Riezman's result crucially depends
on countries reverting to 'reversionary' (retaliation) times even when their terms of trade
improve too much. A country's terms of trade will improve for any of three reasons: (1) the
country sets its own optimal trade barrier, (2) there are random economic fluctuations, and
(3) the other country lowers its trade barriers below the optimum. None of these reasons
provide a country with an incentive to change its trade policy to 'reversionary' times.
On the other hand, Copeland (1986), using a two-stage game with a cooperative first
stage (negotiations) and a noncooperative second stage to model trade policy, demonstrates
that countries will use "alternative types of barriers" (i.e., NTBs) in the second stage. But
this set-up precludes the use of retaliation to enforce the spirit of the negotiated settlement
from the first stage of the game. In a related paper, Copeland (1989) examined tariffs and
1 The recent EEC ban on the importation of hormone treated beef is an example. At one point the U.S. asked
for a GATT panel to be set up to determine if the ban was a health regulation or a trade barrier.
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quotas in a game with the possibility of retaliation. One case involves the negotiated setting
of tariffs but not quotas. He shows that if tariffs are "properly" set in the cooperative stage
then no quota war will start in the noncooperative stage. However, Rodriguez's (1974) trade
eliminating quota war will break out if the tariff negotiations break down or some other
mistake occurs in the tariff negotiations. The final outcome of this case is one of extremes:
no quotas or no trade.
This paper examines the problems that NTBs create for the dispute-settlement mecha-
nism of GATT in a two country infinitely repeated game with uncertainty and asymmetric
information. The next section sets up the model and examines the case where retaliation
is certain when NTBs are suspected. The GATT investigation requirement of the dispute
settlement procedure is added and analyzed in the third section. Concluding remarks are
offered in the final section of the paper.
2. The Game with Certainty of Retaliation
For the purposes of this paper, the dispute settlement mechanism2 will be stripped
down to its barest essential features. It will be modeled as a trigger strategy. A trigger
strategy is a strategy where a player will do action a if the state of the world is A and will
do action b if the state is not A. Specifically, in the context of the GATT this means that a
country will levy its GATT bound tariff level as long as all others do so, but should a trading
partner cheat by raising its tariff or imposing some other trade barrier then the country
will retaliate against its offending trading partner by increasing its tariff on imports.3
In this section, the stylized dispute-settlement mechanism will be analyzed within the
context of a two-country two-good trade model. While each country has some power to
affect world prices it is assumed that each industry is competitive. The use of export taxes
as a way of exploiting monopoly power is ruled out.4 Since trade relations are long-lived,
it is assumed that the game is infinitely played. The whole game consisting of the infinite
repetitions is called a supergame, and each play of the supergame is a subgame. The payoff
(or welfare level) to the supergame is the sum of payoffs of each subgame appropriately
2 The primiary GAT T article dealing with dispute settlement is Article XXHI.
3 In the language of the GATT this is referred to as a compensatory suspension of concessions (Dam 1970).
4 Export taxes and duties are prohibited in the U.S. by article I, section 8, clause 5 of the Constitution.
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discounted. In this supergame each country chooses a strategy that determines what action
to take at each play of the game. These choices depend on the history of prior actions taken
by each player. The present model draws on Green and Porter's (1984) analysis of cartels
under price uncertainty.
Assume that each country has an indirect utility function representing consumer prefer-
ences. The indirect utility function, Ug(pi, Ii), is a nonincreasing function of domestic prices
and a nondecreasing function of income in country i E {1, 2}. Domestic prices and income
are in turn functions of country i's terms of trade5 , Tri, the domestic tariff on the imported
good, -ri, and nontariff barriers (see Copeland 1986 and Woodland 1982 for the derivation).
The set-up used here for the incorporation of NTBs has some elements in common with
Copeland (1986). The first step is to determine the monetary equivalent of NTBs. Defie pi
as the vector of country i's policy instruments. Some of the policy instruments could have
as their mai purpose the limitation of imports while others may have purely domestic goals
but have the effect of adversely interfering with trade. Next, let t;, the level of trade barrier
resulting from pi. be defined as the level of tariffs that would lead to the same reduction in
imports, given world prices. In other words. it is assumed that there exists a function such
that tz = h(pi.
Since Ki is the level of the trade barriers in tariff units induced by pi and ri is the tariff
level that is included in p., the protective impact of the NTBs in the policy instrument
vector (assumed to be everything but ri) is
I-,=K i- 7i.
In other words, the protective effects of NTBs are treated as residuals between tariff levels,
which are negotiated at GATT sponsored Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs), and the
total protective impact of p;. It should be noted that the protective effect of NTBs can be
redundant with other NTBs or the tariff.
Import demands also depend on economic conditions. There are various random sup-
ply and demand shocks which effect the economy. Let these various shocks in each country
be summarized by a single random variable, 6;, such that increases in &; decrease im-
port demand in country i. Next, let g(&1,6~2) be the joint distribution function of the
5 A country's terms of trade is defined here as the relative world price of the imported good to the exported good.
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two random variables. Now each country's import demand function can be represented as
M;(r;,r;, ;1 t,
8 ;). The balance of trade condition
7r1M1(7r1,71,/1,1) = M 2(r2,72,p 2,62)
implicitly defines 7r1 (and thus 72) as
71 = #1(71,i2,p2,61,62).
Assuming the Marshall-Lerner condition holds and that tariff revenues and quota rents are
redistributed to consumers then it is easily shown that the following set of four inequalities
hold
< 0; <0; > 0; 2>0. (1)a/p a6& 86
Define national income as
I;= G(p) + r(rg.ri, pi)
where r(-) is government revenue from the trade barriers,6 and G(pi) is the value of domes-
tic output.7 Domestic prices, qi and pi (consumer and producer prices respectively), are
functions of ri, pi, and rg. Substituting all this into the indirect utility function yields
Ui(qi, G(pi) + r(r, piij)) = H(,r,, j;, ry j, pg,; 56j)
which is assumed concave and twice continuously differentiable in -;r and y;. Given the
derivation of Hi the following inequalities hold
O > 0; j > 0; al > 0; iH < 0; i < 0; O < 0. (2)___ all ri i i 9/1Hj aHj am
Since NTBs are assumed initially invisible, their effects cannot be directly observed.
Therefore each country must use some observable variable as an instrument for the level
of p;. The most handy variable in this set-up is the terms of trade. Consequently, it is
maintained in this section that a country will retaliate if its terms of trade rises (and hence
6 It is possible that r(-) could be negative, irnplying that the NTBs entail some administrative costs and generate
no revenue for the government.
SWoodland defines the GNP function and includes factor endowments as an argument. I assume, in order to keep
the analysis tractable, that factor endowments are constant and therefore suppress the argument.
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worsens) above some trigger level, fr;, that is if r;i(r, ij, rL, yj),6;,6j) > fr;.8 Condition (1)
suggests that 7r; could rise above the trigger for any of three reasons: (i) increases in foreign
tariffs or NTBs, (ii) a rise in the foreign country's random shock term, and/or (iii) a fall in
the domestic random shock term.
Define a contingent strategy for country i as the infinite sequence s; = {sgo,sS i,-..}
where sio is an initial action, and si determines i's action in period t given the history of
previous actions of the other player in the game (i.e., sit = f(h , hi,... ,h -) where ho to
hi 1 describe what occurred in periods 0 to t - 1). Each country's action in any period is
an ordered pair, sit = (-,p ) The cooperative strategy is s' = (-i, 0) where - is country
i's GATT tariff binding (it could be zero if there is free trade) and the retaliation action, s,
is country i's response action to country j's retaliatory tariff (s i) after i has been suspected
of imposing NTBs.
Now let Hg(pzi) = p O,6 , 6 -) be country i's single-period expected payoff
from playing p and let H.U = E5H;(s j,s 6 i.6j) be the single-period expected payoff to
country i after country j has retaliated by levying a compensatory tariff and country i plays
its best response strategy (i.e., it adjusts its level of protective effect of NTBs, perhaps even
to zero). Given this set-up it is safe to assume that
H;(pg) > E,5H;( s ,3,- )> K '.(3)
That is, the single period payoff to defecting is greater than the payoff to cooperating
which is greater than the payoff when the other country is retaliating. 9 Time periods can
be categorized into two groups: "normal" periods and retaliatory periods. In retaliatory
periods one country will retaliate for a past defection by the other country and the defecting
country will play its best response. Normal periods are characterized by the absence of
retaliation.
Let V(p;L) be the expected discounted present value payoff to country i if it sets its
8 Recently, Rep. Gephardt suggested that the U.S. focus on the bilateral trade deficit as an instrument for another
country's use of NTBs. The assumption of balanced trade in this paper rules out the use of such an instrument.
9 This ranking is consistent with that obtained when analysing the optimal tariff using offer curves.
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NTB protective level to y;. Then V;(pi) can be written as:
Vi(pi) = H;(p;) + Pr(7r> -1+ r VS ~ JiHT + I .(I) +iPr(irj: fr)Vi(Ai) (4
t=1
where t 7 is the number of retaliation periods. The payoff is the single-period gain from
defecting (before the other country can react) plus the expected gains from continued de-
fection. Country j will retaliate whenever irj > ir.
Since rj(- --) is a function of two random variables (61 and 62) it is therefore itself
a random variable with distribution F(rg;-r,pi,-rj, pg)(= F(7rj)). Substituting this into
equation (4) and solving for V;() yields
Hi(pi) - H H
) = (5)
1 - # - F(it;G 3)(0- 3 ) 1 ~-
This shows that the discounted present value payoff is what it would be in retaliation
periods plus the single-period payoff gain to playing yL in "normal" periods, appropriately
discounted.
In order to determine the optimal value of p,, we need to examine the first order
conditions of country i's optimization problem. The first order necessary conditions for
equation (5) yields after some cancellation
V/p)= (1 - #f- F~fr g)(#i - #3i) )H(,
+ (/ - ) p)-H
aILti
=0. (6)
That is, country i will set ptg at the level where the marginal gain to increasing its NTB
protective level is just offset by the increase in the risk of triggering retaliation and suffering
a loss.
The same condition holds for country j. When both of these conditions hold, it places
two constraints on the equilibrium vector of NTB protective levels. This outcome demon-
strates that the fact that NTBs aren't observable does not necessarily lead to each country
defecting. The intuitive idea is that country j punishes country i's defection by retaliating
for a sufficient number of periods to wipe out the single period gain country i receives from
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defecting. But this trigger mechanism has the undesirable property of having retaliatory
periods when neither country has defected. Countries will have to retaliate when the ran-
dom economic conditions push their terms of trade past their preset trigger in order to keep
the threat of retaliation credible. Furthermore this game ignores the institutional constraint
that the GATT places on the trading environment.
3. The Game under the GATT Trading Environment
The GATT dispute settlement mechanism requires that an investigation be conducted
before countries retaliate. In addition trade laws in many countries require that an in-
vestigation be launched when trading partners are suspected of engaging in unfair trade
practices. The cost of any investigation must therefore be added to the model. Let the
cost incurred by country i in its investigation of country j's trade practices be denoted
as bi. National income can now be rewritten as G(pj) + r(iri, rj,si,bi). Substituting this
expression into the indirect utility function yields country i's single period payoff fnnction,
H;(rg, pi, rAj, y by, ;, 5) where
O < 0.
ab;
The full impact of NTBs is difficult to detect, let alone measure. Let the probability of
country j detecting country i's NTB after an investigation be denoted as y. It is assumed
to be an increasing and concave function of p; and b such that
0 < (bj, y;) 5 1; 7y(Og ) = 0; Y (oo, y;) = 1; 4 (bj,0) = 0. (7)
The following assumptions axe made to facilitate the analysis:
Al. The magnitudes of 6i and 6j are not observed by the other country and each country
may not easily observe its own random shock.
A2. The investigations are conducted instantaneously, that is, if country i's terms of
trade rises above the trigger in period t, the results of the investigation are known
by period t + 1, and so ret aliation, if warranted, begins in period t +1 1.
Now a country will launch an investigation if its terms of trade rise above some prede-
termined trigger, but it is quite possible that the other country's NTBs may not be detected,
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in which case "normal" times prevail. If the other country's NTBs are detected'0 then the
aggrieved country will retaliate.
Country i's optimal policy is to play s' (it's best response action) in retaliation periods
after being caught defecting and pi in "normal" times. Now Vj(pi) has the functional form:
V;( pi)= Hi(pi)+ Pr(,rj > itg) y (bjjpi)( #!H' + Vi(g)
t= 1
+ (1 - bp} + /3iPr(7r frj)Vj(p). (8)
Solving for Vi(-) yields
V =(p;(0* . + .(9)
1 - /; + (1 - F(tj))-y(bjuy)(#; - #3 ) 1 -i
Again, this shows that the discounted present value payoff is what it would be in retaliation
periods plus the single-period payoff gain to playing yi, in "normal" periods, appropriately
discounted.
In order to determine the opthnal value of pi. we need to examine the first order
conditions of country i's optimization problem. The first order condition of equation (9)
yields the necessary condition1 1 :
V;'(pi) = 0. (10)
Again country i will set y;i at the level where the marginal gain to increasing its NTB
protective level is just offset by the increase in the risk of getting caught and suffering a
loss. Condition (10) places two rigid constraints on the equilibrium vector of NTB protective
levels. Notice that the optimal p; depends on country j's effort at uncovering i's use of
NTBs. It is clear that when b = 0 country i's optimal pi(= fp;) is greater than zero, since
the first order condition evaluated at bj = 0 and pi = 0 is positive. It is reasonable to
suppose that there exists a bg(= b) large enough such that yi; will equal zero. Given this
the locus of points satisfying condition (10) is shown in figure 1. It is assumed that the
second order conditions for a maximum hold.
The main question to be answered is: does country j1 have an incentive to launch an
investigation when its terms of trade worsen (i.e., set b6 > 0)? In order to examine this
10 I amr assuming here that a country will not mistakenly detect NTBs that are not present.
11 The full expression is shown in the appendix.
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question, let V5(b 3) be country j's discounted present value payoff from cooperating and
spending by on trade investigations. In this case Vj has the functional form
t-1 3V(b)i
Vj(b 3) = Hi( pi)+ Pr(irj > frj)f(b, pi){#4Kf(by)+ -E = H + 0-V5(bg)
t= 2
+ Pr(r j > r )(1 - y j(bj, pj))(#jHj(p , bj)+ -FlVj(bj))
+ jPr (irj < fr)Vy(b ) (11)
where
Hg(p j) = E6Hj(r, 0,ip 0, 3;, 65 ),
Hj= EHj(, s ,0, 6;, 65,
Hj(pg, b3) = E8Hj(3Q, 0, ;, by 56j,6j),
and
H (bj)= 9EHg(s s ,b ,Sj).
Some manipulation of equation (11) gives
H i
V17b ) = -
Hj - Hg(p -) + # (I - F(tr)) tHij- ((12H)(b ) (1 - -y )Hg(pg, b 1) )
1 #(O# + F(frg) - OjF(trg)) + 7(1 - FOrt)( *
or country j's payoff if country i defects is what it would receive in retaliatory periods
minus a weighted average of the difference between its single-period payoff from retaliation
and the 'suckers' payoff (H&i)) and the difference between retaliation and the expected
single-period payoff from launching an investigation.
The first order condition for expression (12) yields the necessary condition for a max-
inmm with respect tob:
Vj(by) = 0. (13)
This expression gives two more constraints on the equilibriurn vector. This expression is
also a function of both by and y; When pg equals zero the optimal value of b y is zero since
12 The full expression is found in the appendix.
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expression (13) is negative at p; = 0. The locus of points satisfying condition (13) is shown
in figure 1.
The intersection of the two curves gives the equilibrium values of b3 and pg.13 It should
be noted that the equilibrium involves positive NTB levels. Furthermore, it is interesting
that country j does not spend enough on its investigation to guarantee that country i will
not erect nontariff barriers to trade.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the use of nontariff barriers to trade in a two country infinitely
repeated game. A country's incentive to impose trade barriers was to increase welfare (the
optimal tariff argument). Therefore the results apply only to large countries. This paper
differs from other investigations of NTBs in that GATT procedures on dispute settlement
are incorporated into the analysis. The dispute settlement procedure is modeled as a trigger
strategy.
There are two results of the paper. The first, from section 2, is that the addition of
uncertainty and asymmetric information (NTBs) into a tariff game does not necessarily
lead to noncooperative behavior. However, the equilibrium strategy has the undesirable
property of having retaliatory periods when neither country has defected. Countries have
to retaliate when random economic conditions push their terms of trade past their preset
trigger in order to keep the threat of retaliation credible. The full explanation for the
prevalence of NTBs among large countries must lie elsewhere.
The second and major result shows that with the addition of the investigation tech-
nology the free trade outcome is not achieved. Both countries will impose NTBs even in
the face of threatened retaliation. The main reason behind this is that the risk of getting
caught and the associated losses are not great enough to outweigh the gains from impeding
trade. While this result agrees with both Copeland's (1986) and Riezman's (1987) results,
the present model incorporates the salient features of the trading environment (i.e., the
GAT T). This paper has shown that there is an equilibrium (possibly multiple equilibria)
13 The slope of the locus of points satisfying condition (10) has an ambiguous sign but is continuous and connects
points b, and iti. This fact suggests that there may be more than one equilibrium pair. The important point,
however, is that none of the equilibrium points includes yt, = 0.
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in an infinitely repeated game with the threat of punishment but free trade (or some other
negotiated tariff binding) is not the equilibrium outcome. The present results fit with re-
ality: the record shows that today most industrialized countries impede trade with NTBs




The first order necessary condition for a maximum of expression (9) is:
- (/3i - ?)Hu1 - H') a ((I - F j)- y(bj, /1.j) OF r
= 0. (la)
The first order necessary condition for a maximum of expression (12) is:
b ,;) )- H( ,~)+ 7 &H~bi) T ~)b b
=0o (lb)
where
H- Hj(/li)+±i3(1 - F( j)) {Hj - (7 jE(b,) + (1 -7)H(L'i~bJ))}
1 - I
3 j3 + FQTr1) - i3 FF(r7)) + -y (1 - F'(ir ))(N - f3')
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Figure 1 The NTB Equilibrium
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